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This opinion is subject to revision before final 
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DURRANT, Justice: 
[^1 Elizabeth Reisbeck appeals the district court's 
denial of her motion for extension of time to file her 
notice of appeal. In the underlying case, Reisbeck 
sued HCA Health Services for malpractice and the 
district court granted HCA's summary judgment. 
Reisbeck's attorney mailed a notice of appeal, which 
was filed by the clerk of the court four days after the 
thirty-day deadline. The district court denied 
Reisbeck's subsequent motion for extension of time to 
file her appeal. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
^2 Reisbeck was injured when she fell from her 
hospital bed. She sued HCA Health Services, alleging 
medical malpractice. After conducting written 
discovery and depositions, HCA moved for summary 
judgment. The district court granted summary 
judgment on May 26, 1998. Thereafter, Reisbeck's 
attorney mailed a notice of appeal on Wednesday 
June 24 That notice was filed by the clerk of the 
Third District Court on Monday June 29, thirty-four 
calendar days after entry of judgment. 
P Upon discovering her notice of appeal had been 
filed beyond the thirty-day deadline imposed by rule 
4(a)1 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Reisbeck moved, pursuant to paragraph (e) of the 
same rule, for an extension of time to appeal. In 
support of the motion for an extension, Reisbeck's 
attorney stated he had overlooked the fact that May 
contains thirty-one days, and had consequently 
calculated the deadline as falling on June 26th rather 
than June 25th. He also had assumed that any 
document would be received and filed not later than 
two days after being mailed. 
%4 The court denied Reisbeck's motion for extension 
of tune. Reisbeck appeals that denial. 
DISCUSSION 
K5 Reisbeck concedes her notice of appeal was not 
filed within thirty days, as required by rule 4(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Failure to file a 
timely notice of appeal depnves this court of 
jurisdiction over the appeal. See Armstrong Rubber 
Co v Bastion, 657 P 2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1983); 
Bowen v Rivenon City, 656 P 2d 434, 436 (Utah 
1982). Paragraph (e) of the same rule 4 nevertheless 
provides that 
[t]he trial court, upon a showing of excusable 
neglect or good cause, may extend the time 
for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed 
not later than 30 days after the expiration of 
the tune prescribed by paragraph (a) of this 
rule. No extension shall exceed 30 days 
past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
date of entry of the order granting the motion, 
whichever occurs later. 
Utah R. App P 4(e) (emphasis added). 
16 The trial court's discretion to grant or deny a rule 
4(e) motion is very broad See West v Grand County, 
942 P 2d 337,339-40 (Utah 1997). As we explained 
in West: 
[T]he question of whether any given set of 
facts constitutes "excusable neglect" under 
appellate rule 4(e) is highly fact dependent. 
Moreover, the situations that might be 
presented to a trial court under this rubric are 
so varied and complex that "no rule 
adequately addressing the relevance of all 
these facts can be spelled out." 
Id. (quoting State v Pena, 869 P 2d 932, 939 (Utah 
1994)). 
f7 Before the district court, Reisbeck argued that 
her attorney had "good cause" for failing to ensure the 
notice was timely filed, or alternatively, that her 
attorney's failure was due to "excusable neglect" 
Reisbeck asserted that the good cause criteria 
promulgated by rule 4(e) provide a distinctly more 
"liberal" standard than the excusable neglect criteria. 
The parties bnefed and argued these issues, and the 
trial court denied Reisbeck's motion for an extension 
of tune for the "reasons specified m the opposing 
memorandum." 
f8 On appeal, Reisbeck recapitulates the arguments 
she offered to the trial court and also asserts that the 
trial court failed to apply the proper legal standard. 
Specifically, she argues that this court's holding m 
Murphyv Crosland,915P2d491,494(Utah 1996), 
required the trial court to apply a good cause standard 
instead of an excusable neglect standard. Because the 
precise basis for the trial court's order is unclear and 
because we deem it helpful to resolve ambiguity 
surrounding the correct application of good cause 
versus excusable neglect, we first address the 
argument relating to the scope of applicability of 
those standards. 
%9 Murphy primarily treated the issue of whether 
application of the excusable neglect standard or the 
good cause standard depends on the timing of the 
motion itself. Murphy acknowledged that the majority 
of federal courts treating the federal counterpart to 
Utah's rule 4(e) apply a more liberal good cause 
standard only to those circumstances where a party 
seeks an extension of tune before the initial time 
penod for filing a notice of appeal has expired. See id. 
at 493. Conversely, the majority rule treats cases 
under the rubric of excusable neglect where motions 
for extensions are brought after the initial tune for 
filing a notice has already expired. See id 
f 10 Under the majority rule, excusable neglect 
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and good cause are also subject to different analyses. 
Because application of the majority rule is governed 
by reference to the timing of the motion itself, it is 
not surprising that the pre- deadline good cause 
standard invokes a more liberal treatment than the 
post-deadline excusable neglect standard. Where a 
party anticipates a need for more time to prepare a 
notice of appeal and notifies the trial court of the 
desire to extend the time before the deadline, that 
party will usually be in a more sympathetic position 
than the party who misses the deadline and then 
belatedly attempts to resurrect the opportunity to 
appeal.2 
[^11 Murphy concluded, however, that the 
majority rule- which relied heavily on an apparent 
misapplication of an advisory committee note to the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure-was not well 
reasoned. See id. at 493-94. Murphy instead opted for 
a straightforward textual reading of rule 4(e) rather 
than a policy-based distinction grounded in the timing 
and nature of the motion filed. Since the rule plainly 
states that the motion may be granted for either 
excusable neglect or good cause, and because the rule 
does not draw any distinctions according to the 
timing of the motion, Murphy concluded that both 
excusable neglect and good cause could be invoked to 
support a motion for extension of time either before 
or after expiration of the initial deadline. See id. at 
494. 
[^12 Reisbeck argues the district court should 
have applied a distinctly more liberal good cause 
standard to her motion for extension of time to file 
notice. Reisbeck's argument misapprehends the 
consequences of our decision in Murphy. While it is 
true that our holding in that case allows trial courts to 
assess rule 4(e) motions for both excusable neglect 
and good cause regardless of the timing of the 
motion, this does not mean moving parties may 
simply label their rule 4(e) motions under the rubric 
they happen to prefer and then demand that the trial 
court analyze them accordingly. If we accepted 
Reisbeck's argument, we would effectively delete the 
term "excusable neglect" from rule 4 because all 
moving parties would naturally prefer the good cause 
standard for treatment of their motions to extend time. 
See Pontarelli v. Stone, 930 F.2d 104, 110 (1st Cir. 
1991) 
[^13 Murphy instead necessitates a more nuanced 
and flexible approach to application of good cause 
versus excusable neglect. Because Utah courts may 
not rely on the simple expedient of the timing of the 
motion itself for determining the governing standard, 
the criteria must instead depend on the nature of the 
justification offered to support the motion. By this 
standard, it is apparent rule 4(e) permits a trial court 
to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal based 
on two general categories of justification: (1) 
excusable neglect, which is an admittedly neglectful 
delay that is nevertheless excused by special 
circumstances; or (2) good cause, which pertains to 
special circumstances that are essentially beyond a 
party's control? See, e.g., Scarpa v. Murphy, 782 
F.2d 300, 301 (1st Cir. 1986) (applying good cause 
standard in case of unusually long delay between 
mailing of notice and delivery by post office to clerk's 
office). 
^14 Under this approach, good cause remains a 
more liberal standard. To the extent a factor that 
contributed to, or provoked, a delay in filing was 
genuinely beyond the moving party's control, that 
factor will usually be more supportive of granting a 
motion to extend time than will a factor that is 
admittedly derived from the moving party's neglect. 
Nevertheless, because the assessment of the 
justifications offered by a moving party will remain 
highly fact-intensive, see West, 942 P.2d at 339-40, 
and because any given justification may entail aspects 
both within and beyond the moving party's control, it 
will often be difficult to label a particular justification 
as being either purely related to good cause or purely 
related to excusable neglect Many circumstances 
legitimately may be treated under both rubrics. But 
see Pontarelli, 930 F.2d at 110- 11 (holding two 
standards do not overlap). 
f 15 In short, trial courts should treat each motion 
on its own merits, giving appropriate weight to the 
extent to which a particular justification relates to 
factors within or beyond the party's control. To the 
extent a particular justification implicates factors 
beyond the party's control, a more liberal good cause 
standard should be applied. Conversely, where a party 
or a party's attorney was concededly neglectful, the 
court must determine whether that neglect should, on 
balance, be excused. We reemphasize that the trial 
court's inquiry is fundamentally equitable in nature 
and entails broad discretion. Accordingly, we reaffirm 
West's refusal to establish any specific criteria for 
determining good cause or excusable neglect in the 
specific context of motions for extension of time to 
file notice of appeal. See id. 
|16 Based on these principles and upon the 
deferential standard we apply in reviewing the trial 
court's grant or denial of a motion to extend time, we 
must affirm. In this case, Reisbeck's attorney offered 
two justifications for failing to meet the deadline for 
filing a notice of appeal. First, he miscalculated the 
calendar date for the deadline, and second, he 
assumed that the postal service and Third District 
Court's clerk's office would work in concert to file the 
notice within two business days of his sending it. The 
first factor simply constituted a mistake by Reisbeck's 
attorney. The second factor included elements beyond 
Reisbeck's attorney's control. Nevertheless, the timing 
of postal delivery and court clerk's office filings are 
not subject to absolute predictability. Regardless of 
past experience, a delay of three or four days between 
the mailing and filing of a court document should not 
have been wholly unexpected.4 The gravity of this 
realization should have been augmented by 
recognition of the severe consequence of missing the 
deadline. Failure to timely file a notice of appeal bars 
jurisdiction in the appellate court. See Armstrong 
Rubber Co., 657 P.2d at 1348; Bowen, 656 P.2d at 
436. Moreover, Reisbeck's attorney has conceded 
there was nothing particularly difficult or onerous 
about preparation of the notice of appeal, nor were 
there any circumstances that would have prevented an 
earlier filing. Although it appears that the neglect in 
this case was not particularly egregious, the district 
court did not abuse its broad discretion m denying 
Reisbeck's motion for extension of time. 
117 We affirm. 
1fl8 Chief Justice Howe, Associate Chief Justice 
Russon, Justice Durham, and Justice Wilkins concur 
in Justice Durrant's opinion. 
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1 Rule 4(a), in pertinent part, provides as follows* J 
Appeal from final judgment and order In a case in j 
which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right I 
from the trial court to the appellate court, the j 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed 
with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after 
the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed I 
from. j 
2 It is also not surprising that the term "good cause" appears j 
more applicable to the situation where a motion is brought 
before the deadline, while "excusable neglect" relates more 
naturally to motions afterwards. If the motion is filed before 1 
expiration of the deadline, a party will usually be arguing I 
there is a positive justification for extending the deadline, I 
whereas, if the deadline has already expired, the party must I 
ask the court to excuse the default. j 
3 In this light, the question of whether a motion is brought I 
before or after the deadline simply becomes one relevant j 
factor m the flexible and discretionary balancing analysis 
the trial court must undertake. I 
4 The fact that Reisbeck's attorney asserts that many pnor I 
documents were received and filed within two business I 
days does not materially alter the analysis. The examples [ 
provided by Reisbeck all relate to documents allegedly I 
mailed on a Thursday or Friday, which were apparently all I 
filed on the following Monday (or in one case Tuesday, I 
where the intervening Monday was a holiday). The rules I 
provide that where deadlines calculated according to 
calendar days occur on a weekend or holiday, the filing date I 
is deemed to fall on the first business day following the I 
weekend or holiday See Utah R. App P 22. In this case, I 
the deadline fell on a Thursday and the notice was mailed I 
on a Wednesday. I 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) 
and § 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether District Court Judge Sandra Peuler abused her discretion when she 
considered all of the relevant facts and circumstances before her, concluded that the 
Robertson Family Trust (the "Trust" had no excuse for its forty-five day delay in checking on 
the status of the order before the court, and therefore denied the Trust's motion for an 
extension time to file the appeal. 
Whether facts presented warrant a finding of "excusable neglect" is a legal question 
that is reviewed for correctness. West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1997). 
However, whether any given set of facts constitutes "excusable neglect" is highly fact 
dependent. Id. Therefore, the trial court is given broad discretion in granting or denying 
motions to extend the time for filing an appeal. Id. at 340. See also Prowswood, Inc. v. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 959 (Utah 1984) (phrasing issue as whether district 
court "abused its discretion"). 
2. Whether Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(e) entitled the Trust to file its 
motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal one hundred and thirty-two (132) 
days after the appeal time had expired. Although the Kidder Parties raised this issue in the 
trial court below, the court did not base its denial of the Trust's motion on this issue. 
Nevertheless, this Court may affirm the trial court's decision denying the motion for an 
extension on this alternate basis. Straub v. Fisher & Pavkel Health Care, 990 P.2d 384, 386 
(Utah 1999); Mabus v. Blackstock. 994 P.2d 1272, 1275-76 (Utah Ct App. 1999). 
3. Whether Judge Peuler abused her discretion in denying defendant's motion to 
reconsider. 
Decisions granting or denying motions to reconsider are determined under an abuse of 
discretion standard. In the Matter of the General Determination of the Rights to the Use of 
All the Water, Both Surface and Underground. Within the Drainage Area of Utah Lake and 
Jordan River. 982 P.2d 65, 71 (Utah 1999). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) provides: 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an 
appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate 
court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of 
the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(e) provides: 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of 
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of 
appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case arises out of Judge Sandra Peuler5s denial of the Trust's motion for an 
extension of time in which to file an appeal from the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor Paine Webber, Incorporated, Kidder,Peabody & Co. Incorporated and 
Francis Dunn Jr. (hereinafter collectively the "Kidder Parties."). The Trust failed to file its 
notice of appeal from the judgment within the thirty (30) days required by Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 4(a). Thereafter, the Trust sought an extension of time in which to file a 
notice of appeal. Judge Peuler found that the Trust had unreasonably delayed any effort to 
determine whether and when the order on summary judgment had been entered and that the 
Trust's neglect was not excusable. She therefore denied the motion for an extension and 
subsequently denied the Trust's motion to reconsider. The Trust has appealed from these 
rulings. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On or about March 10, 1998, the Trust submitted a Statement of Claim (the "Claim") 
to the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. alleging that the Kidder Parties had 
recommended and sold inappropriate securities to the Trust in 1981. Upon receiving the 
Statement of Claim, on or about October 7,1998, the Kidder Parties filed an action in the 
Third District Court of Salt Lake County seeking a determination that the Trust's claims were 
untimely and not subject to arbitration. The Kidder Parties simultaneously moved for an 
order staying the NASD arbitration, which motion was granted on November 17, 1998. On 
November 12,1998, the Kidder Parties moved for Summary Judgment on the basis that the 
Trust's claims were time barred and, therefore, not arbitrable. On January 12,1998, the court 
mailed a minute entry to the parties granting the Kidder Parties motion for summary 
judgment. The court entered a formal order on February 8, 1999. 
The Trust filed an untimely notice of appeal on March 10, 1999. The Trust failed to 
pay the required filing fee upon filing its notice. On March 18, 1999, the Trust filed an 
amended notice of appeal with the required fee. On April 23, 1999, the Kidder Parties moved 
for summary disposition on the basis that the appeal was untimely. On June 1, 1999, the Utah 
Supreme Court granted the Kidder Parties' motion for summary disposition and remanded the 
case to the trial court, concluding that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider the 
Trust's untimely appeal. 
On June 23, 1999, the Trust filed an untimely motion for an extension of time in 
which to file a notice of appeal. The district court denied the Trust's motion on September 8, 
1999. On September 13, 1999, the Trust filed a motion to reconsider which the district court 
also denied on December 8,1999. The Trust then filed the instant appeal on January 6, 2000. 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
In its Statement of Facts, the Trust sets forth five pages of disputed allegations 
regarding its underlying claims in the arbitration. Because those facts have nothing to do with 
the issues on appeal, the Kidder Parties will spend no time addressing those facts. The only 
facts which are relevant to this appeal are the facts surrounding the Trust's untimely notice of 
appeal. Those facts are as follows: 
1. On November 12, 1998, the Kidder Parties filed their motion for summary 
judgment, seeking a determination that the Trust's claims were ineligible for arbitration 
because the events giving rise to the claims occurred in 1981, over sixteen year prior to the 
Trust's filing of its Statement of Claim. (R. 71-98). 
2. On December 21, 1998, after receiving the Trust's opposing motion, the 
Kidder Parties filed their reply memorandum which completed briefing on the motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 135-152). The Kidder Parties also filed a notice to submit the 
motion for decision. (R. 157-159). 
3. On January 11,1999, District Court Judge Dennis M. Fuchs granted the 
Kidder Parties' motion for summary judgment. Judge Fuchs prepared and entered a Minute 
Entry granting the motion. The Minute Entry was mailed to each party on January 12,1999 
and instructed the Kidder Parties to prepare the order. (R. 167-169). 
4. On or about January 22, 1999, the Kidder Parties submitted to the court their 
proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment Granting Summary 
Judgment. (R. 177-181) 
5. The Trust was aware on or about January 23, 1999, that the Kidder Parties' 
proposed order had been submitted to the court. (R. 232-234). 
6. On February 3,1999, defendant submitted an untimely objection to the Kidder 
Parties' proposed order challenging two minor points in the order. (R. 170-173). 
7. On February 8,1999, Judge Dennis Fuchs signed plaintiffs proposed order 
and entered final judgment. (R. 177-181). 
8. On March 9, approximately fifty-seven (57) days after receiving the court's 
Minute Entry granting summary judgment, approximately forty-five (45) days after it learned 
that the proposed order had been submitted to the district court, and approximately thirty-four 
(34) days after the Trust submitted its own objection to the proposed order, the Trust made its 
first inquiry to the district court about the status of the order. (R. 232-234). 
9. The Trust evidently did not bother to obtain a copy of the signed order before 
filing its notice of appeal. (R. 217). 
10. On March 11, 1999, thirty-one (31) days after entry of the final judgment, the 
Trust filed its first Notice of Appeal. (R. 182-184) 
11. The Trust did not pay the filing fee required by Rule 3(f) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure at the time it filed the Notice of Appeal. Therefore, the Notice of Appeal 
could not be docketed. (R. 203) 
12. On March 18, 1999, the district court clerk informed the Trust that the Notice 
of Appeal could not be docketed without the appropriate filing fee. (R. 203). 
13. On March 18,1999, the Trust filed an Amended Notice of Appeal with the 
appropriate filing fee. (R. 185-187). 
14. On April 23, 1999, the Kidder Parties filed a Motion for Summary Disposition 
on the basis that the Trust's appeal was not timely filed. 
15. On June 1, 1999, the Utah Supreme Court granted the Kidder Parties' motion 
for summary disposition. (R. 220-221) 
16. On June 23,1999, the Trust filed its motion to extend the time for filing a 
notice of appeal arguing excusable neglect due to misinformation received from the court 
clerk on March 9,1999. (R. 197-212) 
17. On June 30,1999, the Kidder Parties opposed the Trust's motion for an 
extension arguing that the motion was untimely and arguing that the Trust's failure to check 
with the court for forty-five (45) days after the proposed order had been submitted to the 
court, together with its failure to file obtain a copy of the order before filing its notice of 
appeal and its failure to file the notice of appeal with the appropriate filing fee, constituted 
neglect and was without excuse. (R. 214-219). 
18. In a minute entry dated August 30,1999, and in her ultimate order dated 
September 9, 1999, District Court Judge Sandra Peuler agreed with the Kidder Parties' 
analysis of the facts and denied the Trust's motion for an extension. (R. 232-234; 235-237). 
19. On September 13,1999, the Trust filed its motion to reconsider making exactly 
the same arguments that it had made in its original motion for an extension. (R. 238-244). 
20. On December 8, 1999, Judge Peuler denied the Trust's motion to reconsider. 
(R. 264-266). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trust consistently has failed to recognize the basis for Judge Peuler's denial of its 
motion to extend the time for filing an appeal. The basis for that ruling has nothing 
whatsoever to do with the misinformation that the Trust may have received on March 9,1999. 
Rather, Judge Peuler's decision was based upon the fact that the Trust waited until March 9, 
1999, to make its first inquiry of the court regarding the status of the order on summary 
judgment, forty-five (45) days after the order had been submitted to the court for signature. 
The court recognized that it was merely fortuitous that the appeal period had not run on the 
day the Trust finally made its inquiry. When the Trust finally made the call to the court and 
learned that expiration of the appeal period was imminent, it did not bother to obtain a copy of 
the order but waited an additional two days and then filed its notice of appeal—without the 
required filing fee. The trial court was in the best position to evaluate whether the Trust's 
actions constituted excusable neglect. Judge Peuler should be given broad discretion in her 
weighing of the facts, in her consideration of the equities and ultimately, in her decision to 
deny the motion for an extension. This Court should affirm Judge Peuler's decision. 
The denial of the Trust's motion for an extension may also be affirmed on the basis 
that the Trust failed to timely file its motion within thirty (30) days of the expiration of the 
time for filing its notice of appeal as required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(e). 
The trust's motion to reconsider simply presented the district court with the same 
arguments that were made in its original motion for an extension of time. Judge Peuler 
appropriately exercised her discretion in denying the motion to reconsider. This Court should 
affirm the district court order denying the motion to reconsider. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE TRUST'S 
MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR FILING AN APPEAL 
A. The Trust's Inexcusable Neglect in Timely Pursuing Its Appeal Did 
Not Entitle It to an Extension of Time to File that Appeal. 
In its brief, the Trust focuses its analysis entirely upon the alleged misinformation that 
it received from the district court on March 9,1999, the 29th day of the appeal period 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 19). The Trust fails to address, or for that matter even to acknowledge, 
the actual basis for the district court's ruling. Judge Sandra Peuler did not base her decision 
on anything that happened on March 9,1999. Rather, she based her ruling upon the fact that 
the Trust made no effort prior to March 9,1999 to determine the status of the order on 
summary judgment. (R. 232-234; 235-237). It was this neglect and delay that Judge Peuler 
found to be inexcusable and these facts which led her to deny the Trust's request for an 
extension of time to file an appeal. 
Utah Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides as follows: "In a 
case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate 
court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court 
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. 
P. 4(a). The failure to file a timely appeal under Rule 4(a) creates a jurisdictional bar to the 
appeal. See Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 896 P.2d 1230, 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Rule 
4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides some relief from the jurisdictional bar 
in certain very limited circumstances. Rule 4(e) provides: "The trial court, upon a showing 
of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon a 
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) 
of this rule." Utah R. App. P. 4(e) (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that "[w]hen the question of "excusable 
neglect' arises in a jurisdictional context (e.g. Utah R. Civ. P. 73(a))1 . . . the standard 
contemplated thereby is necessarily a strict one," Prowswood v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 
676 P.2d 952, 959 (Utah 1984). The intent of the "excusable neglect" provision in Rule 4(e) 
is "to take care of emergency situations only." Id at 960 (quoting R. Stern, Changes in the 
Federal Appellate Rules, 41 F.R.D. 297, 299 (analyzing comparable Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)). 
The rule "was not intended to permit an extension 'in the absence of circumstances that are 
unique or extraordinary." Id. (quoting Maryland Casualty Company v. Conner, 382 F.2d 13, 
16-17 (10th Cir. 1967)(analyzing Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)). 
As the Trust correctly recognizes, the Utah Supreme Court and other courts have 
articulated four factors for consideration in determining "excusable neglect." West v. Grand 
County, 942 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1997). Those factors are "[i] the danger of prejudice to [the 
nonmoving party], [ii] the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, 
[iii] the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the 
movant, and [iv] whether the movant acted in good faith." Id. at 340-341 (quoting City of 
Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co. 31 F.3d 1041, 1046 (10th Cir. 1994)). These four 
factors, though important, "are not dispositive, but rather, helpful. IdL at 341. Of the four 
factors articulated, "fault in the delay remains a very important factor—perhaps the most 
important factor—in determining whether neglect is excusable." Chanute, 31 F.3d at 1046. 
1
 Rule 73(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was the predecessor to Rule 4 of the Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure. Both rules included a 30 day appeal period and the possibility 
for an extension of time based upon a finding of "excusable neglect." Utah R. App. P. (4)(a) 
& (e). Thus, the same analysis of "excusable neglect" that applied to Rule 73(a) in 
Prowswood, applies to "excusable neglect" in the current Rule 4(e). 
Courts must remember that "the question of whether [an appellant's] conduct is 
excusable is an equitable one, and such determination should take into account all relevant 
circumstances surrounding the party's neglect." West, 942 P.2d at 340 (citing Pioneer Inv. 
Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc, 507 U.S. 380,395 (1993) ("the determination is at bottom an 
equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's 
omission."). The court must also remember that one who "seeks equity must itself do equity." 
Masters v. Worslev, 777 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah Ct App. 1989) (quoting Horton v. Horton, 695 
P.2d 102,107 (Utah 1984)). See also Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d 572,577 (Utah 1999) ("a 
party seeking equity must do so with clean hands") (quoting LHIW, Inc. v. DeLorean, 753 
P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988)). 
Contrary to the Trust's assertions, Judge Peuler properly and appropriately considered 
and applied all of the foregoing considerations in her analysis of "excusable neglect." She 
declined to find that the facts before her presented an emergency situation or that the 
circumstances were so unique and extraordinary as to justify a finding of "excusable neglect." 
She declined to focus solely upon the phone call of March 9, 1999, and instead, took into 
consideration all of the circumstances surrounding the Trust's neglect in this case. She 
recognized that although the length of the delay, the prejudice to the Kidder Parties' and the 
Trust's good faith were all factors to consider, those factors were outweighed by the 
defendant's unexplained and inexcusable delay and failure timely to check on the status of the 
order.2 She recognized that before the Trust was entitled to take advantage of the 
2
 Curiously, the Trust finds fault with Judge Peuler's finding that "defendant's delay in 
checking with the Court and timely filing its appeal does not appear to have been beyond the 
control of the defendant." (R. 232). The language used by Judge Peuler in this finding is 
taken nearly verbatim from the West case and is one of the four factors that the court was 
required to consider in making its decision. West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 
1997). The finding was simply one of Judge Peuler's several findings and an appropriate 
issue for consideration. 
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misinformation that it may have received on March 9, 1999, it was obligated to demonstrate 
that its actions in seeking a timely appeal were otherwise appropriate. This the Trust could 
not, and did not, do. 
The critical, undisputed, facts before the court were these: 1) the Trust knew by 
January 11, 1999 that the district court had granted summary judgment; 2) the Trust knew on 
January 23, 1999 that a proposed order had been submitted to the district court for signature; 
3) the Trust itself had submitted an objection to the proposed order by February 3, 1999; and, 
4) the Trust nevertheless waited until March 9,1999, to make its first inquiry to the court—45 
days from submission of the proposed order and 34 days from the submission of its own 
objection. (R.232-234; 235-237). Judge Peuler specifically relied upon the foregoing facts in 
her order denying the motion for an extension Id. The court also had a number of additional 
undisputed facts before it which could have supported Judge Peuler's decision to deny the 
motion. Those facts include: that the Trust made a single phone call regarding the order and 
neglected to obtain a copy of the order from the court to confirm the date of entry of the order; 
that the Trust, despite its knowledge of the imminence of the appeal cut-off deadline, waited 
an additional two days before filing its notice; and, that when the Trust finally filed its notice 
of appeal, it neglected to pay the filing fee required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
3(f).3 (R. 202-204). All of these facts, taken together, clearly justified the Judge Peuler's 
decision to deny the Trust's equitable motion for an extension. 
The Utah Supreme Court case of Prowswood. Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 
P.2d 952 (1984) is particularly instructive here. In Prowswood the defendant prevailed on the 
merits. Prowswood then prepared a notice of appeal and sent it to the court for filing by a 
3
 The failure to file the fee did not automatically invalidate the appeal. However, the failure 
to file the fee is sufficient grounds for dismissal of an appeal by tins Court under appropriate 
runner who neglected to pay the filing fee. Id. at 954.4 The next day, still within the thirty 
(30) day appeal period, Prowswood contacted the court clerk for an assurance that the appeal 
had been properly filed. Id. at 957 The clerk allegedly informed the appellant that the appeal 
had been properly filed and neglected to mention that the filing fee had not been paid. Id. 
Thereafter, after the appeal time had expired, the district court notified the appellant that the 
fee had not been paid. Id. at 954. Appellant then immediately moved for an extension of time 
in which to properly file its appeal which was granted by the district court upon a finding of 
excusable neglect. Id. Mountain Fuel appealed this decision of the district court. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court declined to find "excusable neglect" and reversed 
the decision of district court. Id. at 961. The Court noted that "the oversight and inadvertence 
of counsel in this case preceded and occurred wholly independently of the purported error of 
the deputy court clerk." IcL Therefore, Prowswood could not rely upon the clerk's error to 
excuse its own neglect Id. 
The instant case is analogous to Prowswood. Here, the Trust neglected for forty-five 
(45) days after the submission of the proposed order to check on the status of that order. Had 
the trust diligently monitored the status of the order, it could easily have filed a timely appeal. 
Moreover, had the proposed order been signed by Judge Fuchs at any time within the fifteen 
days after its submission to the court, the Trust's belated call on March 9,1999, would have 
circumstances. See Utah R. App. P. 3(a). Thus, it would have been appropriate for the 
district court to factor that failure into its analysis of the Trust's inexcusable neglect. 
4
 Prowswood was decided under former Rule 73(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
which provided that an appeal was invalid unless a notice of appeal was timely filed along 
with the proper fee. Subsequent to Prowswood, the Utah Supreme Court replaced Rule 73(a) 
with Rules 3 and 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 3(a) diverged from 
former Rule 73(a) in that "the timely payment of fees on an appeal from the district court is 
no longer jurisdictional." Dipoma v. McPhic 2000 Utah 130, P14, 200 Utah App. LEXIS 44, 
12, 394 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (2000) (quoting State v. Johnson. 700 P.2d 1125, 1129 n.l (Utah 
1985). Although Rule 3(a) changed the analysis of Prowswood with respect to the 
jursdictional nature of filing fees, the fundamental "excusable neglect" analysis in Prowswood 
remains good law. 
1? 
been too late. It was merely fortuitous for the Trust that the appeal period had not run on 
March 9, 1999, when it finally made its call. Upon learning that the order had been signed, 
the Trust then compounded its neglect by failing promptly to obtain a copy of the signed order 
which would have demonstrated the filing date. The Trust then waited two more days to file 
notice of appeal and then filed the notice without the required fee. As was the case in 
Prowswood. the alleged misinformation received from the clerk on March 9, 1999, did not 
excuse the neglectful conduct by the Trust up to and after that telephone call. 
As the Utah Supreme Court recently reiterated, Judge Peuler is "given broad discretion 
in granting or denying motions to extend the time for filing an appeal." West v. Grand 
County, 942 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1997). See also Prowswood, 676 P.2d at 959 (the question 
is whether the district court "abused its discretion"). Judge Peuler did not abuse her discretion 
in this case. She properly considered the Trust's conduct and the equities in the case and 
denied the Trust's motion for an extension. This Court should affirm that decision. 
B. The Unique Circumstances Doctrine Does Not Save the Trust's 
Untimely Appeal. 
As it did in its "excusable neglect" argument, the Trust focuses solely upon the March 
9, 1999 telephone call with the court clerk. The Trust completely ignores all of the other 
circumstances and equities which led the trial court to deny the Trust's motion for an 
extension. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently referenced the "unique circumstances" doctrine in 
West v. Grand County. 942 P.2d 337, 341 (Utah 1997). The Court recognized that "[i]f the 
district court induced detrimental reliance by the appellant resulting in the filing of an 
untimely notice of appeal, we may allow the appeal in the best interests of justice' given such 
unique circumstances." Id, ("emphasis added) (quoting Senjo v. Murray, 943 F.2d 36, 37 
(10th Cir. 1991) (per curium)). The West decision makes two important points. First, the 
court's decision to allow an appeal is permissive, not mandatory. Second, the appeal should 
only be allowed where it is "in the best interest of justice." Judge Peuler concluded that the 
granting the extension here was not in the best interests of justice. 
The facts in West are also instructive. In West, the appellant argued that it was typical 
for the trial court to delay for six-months before issuing and entering orders in her case. Id. 
Therefore, she argued, the court's practice had lulled her into inaction resulting in her failure 
to learn that the order had been entered until after the appeal period had expired. Id at 340. 
The Court declined to hold that the district court's practice was "a per se excuse for trial 
counsel's failure to fulfill the duty to check with the clerk periodically to determine whether 
orders [had] been entered." IcL at 341. That practice was merely a factor for the trial court to 
consider on remand. Id 
Here, as in West, the action of the court which allegedly produced detrimental reliance 
by the Trust was merely a factor for the trial court to consider in its Rule 4(e) analysis. The 
Trust presented the facts of the alleged March 9, 1999 telephone call to Judge Peuler. Judge 
Peuler was not persuaded that the March 9, 1999 call excused the Trust's failure to timely file 
its appeal. Judge Peuler recognized, as did the Court in West, that the Trust had a duty "to 
check with the clerk periodically to determine whether orders [had] been entered." Id. at 341. 
It was this duty, and the neglect of that duty until March 9, 1999, that led Judge Peuler to 
deny the Trust's motion. 
The only case relied upon by the Trust in its "unique circumstances" analysis is the 
Eleventh Circuit case of Pinion v. Dow Chemical 928 F.2d 1522,15323 (11th Cir. 1991). 
The Trust cites Pinion for a basic principle of law. The Trust does not argue from the facts in 
Pinion because the facts are not analogous to this case. It does not rely upon the holding of 
Pinion because the Eleventh Circuit declined to find "unique circumstances" in that case. The 
Trust quotes only one paragraph from Pinion and ignores other paragraphs which are equally 
important. For example, Pinion recognized that the "unique circumstances" doctrine "is an 
equitable doctrine that enables [the court] to consider all the relevant circumstances in 
deciding whether to exercise the power that [it has]." Id The Court also noted that the 
doctrine is a "narrowly construed equitable exception." IcL at 1534. 
For all of the reasons previously given, the facts and the equities in this case do not 
justify the application of this narrowly drawn "unique circumstances" exception. Judge 
Peuler, who was in the best position to weigh those facts and equities, and who is given broad 
discretion to grant or deny a motion for an extension, properly denied the Trust's motion in 
this case. This Court should affirm Judge Peuler's decision. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION MAY BE AFFIRMED 
BECAUSE THE TRUST'S MOTION TO EXTEND WAS UNTIMELY. 
In opposing the Trust's motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, the 
Kidder Parties argued that the motion to extend was untimely and that the trust's neglect in 
failing to file a timely appeal was without excuse. (R. 214-219). Judge Peuler was persuaded 
by the Kidder Parties' second argument and denied the motion on that basis. She did not base 
her decision on the fact that the motion to extend was untimely. However, this Court may 
affirm the on any proper ground presented to the district court. See, Straub v. Fisher & 
Pavkel Health Care. 990 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1999); Mabus v. Blackstock. 994 P.2d 1272, 
1275-76 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure clearly and specifically requires 
that a motion to extend be "filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule." Utah R. App. P. 4(e) (emphasis added). The 
District Court entered its final order on February 8,1999. The time prescribed by Rule 4(a) 
for the Trust to file its appeal expired on March 10,1999. Pursuant to Rule 4(e), the Trust 
was required to file its motion for an extension within the following thirty (30) days, or by 
April 9, 1999. The Trust did not file its motion for extension of time until June 22, 1999, one 
hundred and thirty-two (132) days after the time for filing the appeal expired. The Trust's 
motion was untimely and this Court may affirm the district court's denial of the motion on 
that basis. 
IBL THE DISTRICT COURT APPROPRIATELY DENIED THE TRUST'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER. 
In its motion to reconsider, the Trust relied upon the same facts, and made the same 
arguments, that were presented to the court in connection with its motion for an extension of 
time. Judge Peuler continued to find those facts and arguments unpersuasive. If this Court 
affirms Judge Peuler's denial of the motion for an extension, it must similarly deny the 
motion to reconsider. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Kidder Parties respectfully request this Court to 
affirm the district court's denial of the Trust's motion for an extension of time to file an 
appeal and motion for reconsideration 
DATED this 6th day of June, 2000. 
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Defendant has had an opportunity to conduct discovery and an 
open invitation from plaintiff to request any documents they needed 
and defendant has failed to request documents. The Court therefore 
denies defendant's request to stay the determination of Summary 
Judgment pending further discovery. 
There still being no written agreement for arbitration, the 
Court finds the Motion for Summary Judgment is ripe for decision 
and finds that the Court has jurisdiction over the issue of 
arbitration as per the argument of plaintiff and ruling of the 
Court granting the temporary stay of arbitration. 
PAINEWEBBER V. ROBERTSON PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
The Court finds that if the NASD is interpreted as a statute 
of repose, the six year limitation started running 1981. However, 
even if the Court should consider the NASD rule as a statute of 
limitations and as per the argument of defense that the discovery 
rule should apply, the Court would find that the Robertson Trust 
was put on notice long before 1992 that there were significant 
problems with, the investment. Defendant should have been on notice 
from approximately 1984 forward. The Court finds that with any 
kind of diligent investigation on the part of defendant he would 
have discovered the problems. 
For the foregoing reasons and the additional argument as 
contained in plaintiff's Memorandum, the Court finds that the 
action is time barred and hereby grants plaintiff's Motion. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, ORDER 
AND JUDGMENT GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 980910104 
Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Motion for Summary Judgment and defendant's request for a Rule 
56(f) continuance were fully briefed by the parties and submitted to the Court for decision. 
The Court, having reviewed all of the motions, memoranda, affidavits and other evidence 
submitted by the parties, and good cause appearing therefore, finds, concludes and orders as 
follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiffs presented the following material facts in support of their motion for summary 
judgment Defendants produced no evidence to dispute these facts: 
1. In 1981, plaintiffs assisted James L. Robertson with the purchase of an interest in 
Lauren Plaza Associates, Ltd ("Lauren Plaza") which owned and operated a shopping center. 
2. Plaintiffs and Mr. Robertson did not enter into a written agreement between them 
relating to the Lauren Plaza investment or relating to any other matter. 
3. There was no further interaction between plaintiffs and defendant after 1981. 
4. Defendant claims that James L. Robertson purchased the Lauren Plaza Investment 
based upon plaintiffs' erroneous investment advice and that the advice was erroneous 1) because 
James L. Robertson was not in a 50% tax bracket in or after 1981; 2) because the shares were not 
easily transferrable, there being no market for the shares; 3) because the shopping center was not 
sold within five years resulting in a quick profit; and 4) because Lauren Plaza was not the safest 
possible investment. 
5. In 1984, Balcor, the general partner of Lauren Plaza, told Mr. Robertson that 
there were no plans to sell the shopping center. This information concerned Mr. Robertson 
because he had understood from the investment advise that the shopping center would be sold 
within five years of 1981, resulting in a substantial profit to investors in Lauren Plaza. 
6. In 1986, Balcor told Mr. Robertson that there were no plans to sell the shopping 
center and that problems had developed. 
7. In every Lauren Plaza annual report after 1986, Balcor reported problems. 
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8, In 1991, Balcor informed Mr. Robertson that the partnership planned to hold the 
shopping center for another two to three years if the partnership could negotiate a loan 
modification. 
9. Defendant ignored plaintiffs' invitation to request any documentation that it 
believed would be helpful to oppose plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Defendant has 
not attempted to do any formal or informal discovery in this case. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction to consider the eligibility of defendant's claims for 
arbitration under Rule 10304 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure. Cogswell v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 78 F.3d 474, 476 (10th Cir. 1996). 
2. Defendant is not entitled to a Rule 56(f) continuance because it has neglected to 
do any formal or informal discovery to date, has failed to explain why it cannot present sufficient 
evidence to support its opposition, Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 840 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987), and has failed to "explain how the requested continuance will aid [its] opposition to 
summary judgment." Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482, 488 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
3. Rule 10304 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure provides a substantive 
limit on claims that may be submitted to arbitration in the nature of a statute of repose. Cogswell 
v, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78 F.3d 474, 479 (10th Cir. 1996). CIRaithaus 
v. Saah-Scandia of America, Tnc, 784 P.2d 1158, 1160 (Utah 1989). Thus, defendant's claims 
became ineligible for arbitration in 1987, six years from the date that James Robertson purchased 
his investment in Lauren Plaza. 
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4. Even if Rule 10304 is construed to be a statute of limitations, defendant's claims 
were barred no later than 1990. James Robertson discovered, or would have discovered through 
any kind of diligent investigation, that his investment had serious problems beginning in 1984. 
The limitations period began to run upon first learning of his legal injury in 1984, not upon 
learning of the full extent of his damages in 1992. Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93, 99-100 (Utah 
1982). 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
The Court, having carefully considered the arguments for and against the motion for 
summary judgment and the request for a Rule 56(f) continuance, and the Court having 
announced its decisions regarding the motion and request in a minute entry dated January 11, 
1999, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
2. Defendants request for a Rule 56(f) continuance is denied. 
3. NASD arbitration proceeding, Case No. 98-00981, is permanently stayed. 
4. Defendant is permanently enjoined from seeking to arbitrate any claims against 
plaintiffs that are based upon events and occurrences that took place more than six years prior to 
the date of this order. 
4 
MADE AND ENTERED this / day of February, 1999. , ' 
BY THE COURT 
If 
DENNIS M^UCHS 
Third JudiciaTfJ5stoctj3p^P' 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, KIDDER, PEABODY & 
CO. INC., a Delaware corporation 
and VAN FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an 
individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by 
and through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, 
Trustee, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 980910104 
Before the Court is a Notice to Submit for Decision on 
defendant's Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of 
Appeal. The Court having reviewed the pleadings filed in this 
matter, now enters the following ruling. 
The defendant's Motion for Extension of Time is denied. 
Defendant's failure to timely file its appeal is not excusable 
neglect. Although it appears that the late filing does not 
prejudice plaintiff, nor was the length of delay substantial, and 
further while there is no evidence that the movant acted in bad 
faith, it appears to the Court that the reason for delay was not 
beyond the control of the movant. As pointed out by plaintiff, 
defendant knew that the Court had granted Summary Judgment on or 
PAINEWEBBER V. ROBERTSON PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
about January 11, 1999. Further, the defendant knew on or about 
January 23 that plaintiff had submitted its proposed Order. 
Defendant's failure to check with the clerk for a period in excess 
of 30 days to see whether an Order had been entered was neglect, 
but is not excusable. Based upon that, the defendant's Motion is 
denied. 
Counsel for plaintiff is directed to prepare an Order 
consistent with this ruling. 
Dated this ^° day of August, 1999. 
SANDRA N. PE 
DISTRICT COURTX^ JUDG, 
m
*&*~26 4?/ 
PAINEWEBBER V. ROBERTSON PAGE THREE MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, this 3 <Q 
day of August, 1999: 
Robert W. Payne 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Brian W. Steffensen 
Attorney for Defendant 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Third Judicial District 
Robert W. Payne (5334) 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)237-1900 
Facsimile: (801)237-1950 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO., 
INC., a Delaware corporation, and VAN 
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by and 
through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, Trustee, 
Defendant. 
Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal came 
regularly before the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, on August 30, 1999. The Court, having 
reviewed the memoranda and pleadings submitted by the parties and having announced its 
decision regarding the motion in a minute entry, and good cause appearing therefor, 
THE COURT FINDS AND CONCLUDES as follows: 
A. Defendant knew that the Court had grant Summary Judgment on or about July 11, 
1999. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH 
TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 980910104 
Honorable Sandra N. Peuler 
B. Defendant knew that plaintiff had submitted a proposed Order on summary 
judgment on or about January 23, 1999. 
C. Despite this knowledge, defendant failed to check with the clerk for a period in 
excess of thirty (30) days to see whether the order had been executed by the Court. 
D. Although the late filing does not appear to have prejudice the plaintiff, the length 
of delay was not substantial, and there is no evidence that defendant acted in bad faith, 
defendant's delay in checking with the Court and timely filing its appeal does not appear to have 
been beyond the control of the defendant. 
E. Defendant's delay for more than thirty (30) days to see whether the Court had 
entered the proposed order was neglect. 
F. Defendant's neglect in failing to timely file its appeal is not excusable. 
Therefore, THE COURT ORDERS as follows: 
Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal is hereby 
denied. 
MADE AND ENTERED this °j day of September, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
§ANDRAN.P! 
Third Judicial D! 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Brian W. Steffensen 
2 
CFKTTFTCATR OF SF.RVTCE 
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of September, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH 
TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served by regular mail, via United States Postal 
Service, postage prepaid, on the following: 
Brian W. Steffensen 
STEFFENSEN, McDONALD & STEFFENSEN 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
PAYNER\SLC\072413 01 3 
Brian W. Steffensen, P.C (3092) 
Steff ensen • McDonald • Steffensen 
2159 S. 700 E., Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Tel: (801)485-3707 
Fax: (801) 485-7140 
Attorney for Defendant the Robertson Family Trust 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PATNEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO., 
INC., a Delaware Corporation, and VAN 
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by 
and through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, 
Trustee, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION RE THEIR 
MOTION FOR 
AN EXTENSION OF TTME IN WHICH 
TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL 
AND OBJECTION TO PROPOSED 
ORDER 
And Request for Hearing 
Civil No. 980910104 
Judge Sandra Peuler (originally assigned to 
Judge Fuchs and reassigned to Judge Peuler) 
In issuing its ruling on Defendants' Motion for an Extension of Time in Which to File 
Ndtice of Appeal, the Court based its denial of said motion on the erroneous assumption of fact 
that Defendants had not inquired as to the execution of the order within the thirty (30) day 
appeal time period — and ruled that this was not "excusable neglect." 
The true facts are, as outlined in the attached affidavit which was filed with the Utah 
Supreme Court, as follows: 
L Defendants counsel inquired as to the execution of the order on or about March 9, 1999 — 
the 29th day. 
2. A Clerk of Court told Defendants' counsel that the order had been executed on February 
10, 1999. This was in error, but Defendants' counsel relied upon it. 
3. The Notice of Appeal was drafted and staff instructed to file it on March 10, 1999. 
However, thinking that there was no rush, the Notice of Appeal was not actually filed 
with the Court until the next day, March 11, 1999. 
Since the true facts are that Defendants did inquire as to the date of execution within the thirty 
day time period, but were given inaccurate information which caused them to miss the deadline 
by a single day, Defendants respectfully request that the Court reconsider its denial of the Motion 
for Extension. The actions of Defendants in these regards constituted excusable neglect and 
justice and equity demand that they be allowed to proceed with their appeal. 
These facts, plus the case law cited in Defendants moving papers, support the granting of 
the motion in question. 
Defendants object to the proposed Order being signed until their Motion for 
Reconsideration is resolved. 
Defendants request a hearing on their Motion for Reconsideration. 
DATED this / j ^ d a y of September, 1999. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing paper this / 
1999, via the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to: 
41 day of_ -S&2 
Bryon J. Benevento 
Robert W. Payne 
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
3 
Robert W. Payne (5334) 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)237-1900 
Facsimile: (801)237-1950 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAINEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, KIDDER, PEABODY & CO. 
INC., a Delaware corporation, and VAN 
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by and 
through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, Trustee, 
Defendant. 
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration re their Motion for an Extension of Time in 
Which to File Notice of Appeal came regularly before the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, on 
November , 1999. The Court, having reviewed the memoranda and pleadings submitted by 
the parties, and good cause appearing therefor, 
THE COURT FINDS AND CONCLUDES as follows: 
Third Jadiclcf District 
DEC - 8 1S99 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
Case No. 980910104 
Honorable Sandra N. Peuler 
A. Defendant did not submit a timely objection to defendants' proposed Order 
Denying Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal as permitted by Rule 
4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
B. On September 9, 1999, the Court entered its Order Denying Motion for Extension 
of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal. 
C. On September 13, 1999, plaintiff submitted a Motion for Reconsideration re their 
Motion for an Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal. 
D. Motions to reconsider are not provided for under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and have never been recognized as a proper motion in this state. 
E. The arguments set forth in plaintiffs motion to reconsider are not persuasive. 
THEREFORE, the Court declines plaintiffs invitation to reconsider its September 9, 
1999, Order Denying Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Notice of Appeal. 
MADE AND ENTERED this J[_ day of Noyfember, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
SANDRA N. 
Third Judicial 
2 
CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of November, 1999,1 caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER to 
be served, via United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, on the following: 
Brian W. Steffensen 
STEFFENSEN, McDONALD & STEFFENSEN 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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Brian W. Steffensen, P.C (3092) 
Steffensen • McDonald • Steffensen 
2159 S. 700 E., Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Tel: (801) 485-3707 
Fax: (801) 485-7140 
Attorney for Defendants the Robertson Family Trust and James L. Robertson 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PATNEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO., 
INC., a Delaware Corporation, and VAN 
FRANCIS DUNN, JR., an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
DEFENDANTS' 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
vs. 
The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by 
and through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, 
Trustee, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 980910104 
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs 
Notice is hereby given that the defendants/appellants Robertson Family Trust and James L. 
Robertson, by and through their attorney of Record, Brian W. Steffensen, appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals all orders and rulings in this action, including the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order entered on February 10, 1999, by the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs, Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The appeal is taken from 
entirety of all orders and rulings entered by the Court in this action, including, but not limited to, 
the entire Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
DATED this JD_ Day of March, 1999. 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing paper this \\ day 
the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Bryon J. Benevento 
Robert W. Payne 
SNELL & WELMER, L.L.P. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Brian W. Steffensen, P.C. (3092) 
Steffensen • McDonald • Steffensen 
2159 S. 700 E., Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Tel: (801) 485-3707 
Fax: (801) 485-7140 
Attorney for Defendants the Robertson Family Trust and James L. Robertson 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PATNEWEBBER, INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, KIDDER PEABODY & CO., 
INC., a Delaware Corporation, and VAN 
FRANCIS DUNN, JR, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
DEFENDANTS' AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
vs. 
The ROBERTSON FAMILY TRUST, by 
and through JAMES L. ROBERTSON, 
Trustee, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 980910104 
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs 
Notice is hereby given that the defendants/appellants Robertson Family Trust and James L. 
Robertson, by and through their attorney of Record, Brian W. Steffensen, appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals all orders and rulings in this action, including the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order entered on February 10,1999, by the Honorable Dennis M. 
Fuchs, Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The appeal is 
taken from entirety of all orders and rulings entered by the Court in this action, including, but not 
limited to, the entire Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
DATED this / ^ Day of March, 1999. 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing paper this jit 
day of March, 1999, via 
the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Bryon J. Benevento 
Robert W. Payne 
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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